The propagation strategy of 1907 took full advantage of the religious policy of the Japanese Regency General of Korea, which had already given of³cial sanction to the spread of Japanese religious teachings in Korea. In a bid to incorporate the missionary activities of Japanese Buddhist monks and Shinto priests into its Korea policy, the Regency General of Korea introduced "Regulations on the Promulgation of Religion" (Shðkyõ no senpu ni kansuru kisoku ;îÖè+ÓFÁó y'). Through this legislation, matters pertaining to missionary appointments and religious buildings were integrated into the colonization policies of the Regency General led by Itõ Hirobumi. The Regency General had power of approval regarding matters concerning Japanese religious teachings. Once approved, the rights-administrative or institutional-pertaining to these religious activities were of³cially protected.
Under political protection provided by the de facto colonial government, the Sõtõ sect soon saw a steady increase in its Korean temples and followers. Needless to say, propagation was focused upon the seven regional bases chosen in 1907-Pusan, Ky®ngs®ng, Yongsan, Inch'®n, P'y®ngyang, Yongamp'o, and Taej®n. In the capital city, Ky®ngs®ng, the monk Õtaka Daijõ ØNØÏ opened in 1908 the ³rst Sõtõ Buddhist hall, Ilhansa, and Takeda Hanshi D,-î (1863-1911) , as the director of Sõtõ promulgation in Korea, initiated an aggressive proselytization campaign. Two years later, in 1910, Takeda was able to erect a grand-scale temple known as Chogyesa gV±, which would serve as the propagation headquarters of the Sõtõ sect in Korea. In Inch'®n, where more than 10,000 Japanese had already settled, an ambitious missionary monk, Isobe Hõsen rH·ä, was able to secure Sõtõ patrons from approximately 130 households and to establish Hwa®msa. Thus, by the time of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 , all of the ³rst-phase bases for propagation (except for that in P'y®ng-yang, which would be established in 1912) had been set up as planned. At this stage, the majority of Sõtõ followers were still Japanese residents who had had family af³liations with the Sõtõ sect prior to migrating to Korea. Assessing the initial phase of "opening teachings" in Korea as a success, the Sõtõ sect revised its propagation strategy in 1911 to keep it in line with the new political environment of colonized Korea, and it appointed Kitano Genpõ ëŸâ· as the new director of the propagation bureau. The new strategy aimed at opening nine more propagation bases (Kaes®ng, Masan, Chinhae, Taegu, Chinnamp'o, U ºiju, Kunsan, continued until 1895, when the two temples agreed to unite and establish a single, central administration (called shðmuchõ ;Yz) in Tokyo.
Mokp'o, and W®nsan), directing Sõtõ teachings more aggressively, and inducing more Korean monks to enter the Sõtõ order (SKKDHI 1980, p. 35) . The opening of nine more bases was an ambitious task designed to cover all of the major urban centers of Korea and to reach out to its colonized people. For this task, Kitano brought ten elite Sõtõ college graduates to Ky®ngs®ng for their Korean language training. Upon receiving this training, these graduates were to spearhead Sõtõ propagation. All plans proceeded smoothly, and the number of Korean converts gradually increased. Once converted, these new followers were organized into suitable units of lay confraternities (such as a women's association, a Kannon worship group, and a "payment of favor" [hõon ³0] confraternity). By the end of 1911, some temples boasted large congregations. For example, Pusan Ch'ongch'®nsa claimed to have more than 1,500 faithful: Yongsan S®ryongsa 800, Inch'®n Hwa®msa 700, Taej®n Taej®nsa 500, Ky®ngs®ng Ilhansa 400, and Kunsan Ku ›mgangsa 300 (SAMBO HAKHOE 1994, p. 27) .
Of course, it goes without saying that the remarkable success of Sõtõ propagation in Korea was owing to the protection and support of the Japanese colonial government as well as to sectarian endeavors and strategies. In fact, the Government-General of Korea was so supportive throughout the 1910s that it permitted the Sõtõ sect to build Buddhist halls and other related facilities on state-owned lands. For example, when the Sõtõ sect asked for public lands in 1912, the Government-General of Korea allowed, at no cost, the use of a parcel of state-owned land consisting of 6,000 tsubo (approximately 2 square kilometers) in Hoeny®ng (Hamgy®ng Province) for the construction of Hoes®nsa. In the late 1910s Chogyesa Temple in Ky®ngs®ng was even allowed to use the historic buildings (e.g., Sungj®ng Hall, Hwangg®n Gate, and Hoes®n Hall) of the Chos®n court when it was moved to a new location. The delighted Sõtõ sect did not waste any time in transforming these historic buildings into the headquarters for Sõtõ propagation in colonial Korea (SKKDHI 1980, p. 39) .
Amid the rapid spread of Sõtõ teachings in Korea, in 1915 Sõtõ headquarters in Japan began to dispatch high-placed monks to Korea for what was known as "personal preaching" (goshinge :V5). The direct teaching of prominent monks proved to be a great encouragement to missionary monks, who were somewhat isolated in their local parishes. As time went by, Sõtõ monks gained more con³dence in their missionary activities and expanded their missions to include social projects related to recreation, education, politics, agriculture, and even commerce. Many Sõtõ temples became regional centers that managed auxiliary social organizations, confraternities, and educa-tional institutions such as libraries, kindergartens, and Japanese language schools.
All of the second-phase propagational temples were successfully set up by 1927, culminating in the establishment of the U ºiju temple on the northwestern tip of the Korean Peninsula. This meant a comprehensive Sõtõ network covered the entire peninsula. In fact, by this time the Sõtõ sect had penetrated deep into Korea, as additional temples and propagation stations (Kor. p'ogyoso; Jpn. fukyõsho +î‹) were established in almost all major cities and towns, including, in chronological order, Chinju, Ch'®lw®n, Ch'ungju, Ky®ngju, Naju, Ky®ngsan, T'ongy®ng, and P'y®ngt'aek. In the midst of the ongoing increase of Sõtõ temples and propagation stations in Korea, the propagation director held a special meeting in Ky®ngs®ng in 1929, to which not only Sõtõ missionaries but also Korean monks were invited, in order to extend the compassion of the Sõtõ sect to declining Korean Buddhism. As Japan took control of Manchuria in the early 1930s, Japanese Buddhists in Korea intensi³ed their missionary efforts among the Korean people. As if commemorating the legacies of Itõ Hirobumi QnNk (1841-1909), who had played a critical role in Japan's continental expansion (particularly with regard to the Korean annexation), in 1932 the Sõtõ sect erected a grandiose temple in Ky®ngs®ng just when the de facto Manchurian colonization took place and named it after him-Pakmunsa Nk± (Hirobumi-tera in Japanese). Each year a memorial service for Hirobumi was held at this temple (SZK 1970, p. 708; 1973, p. 6) .
It is, therefore, no wonder that Prime Minister Saitõ Makoto presented a statue of Kannon to the Sõtõ sect in Korea in 1934 in recognition of its attempts to provide the Korean people with "spiritual guidance." Upon its presentation, the Sõtõ sect erected a Kannon hall in Yakch'o-ch®ng (SKKDHI 1980, p. 42) . This kind of political acknowledgment clearly illustrates the relationship between the Sõtõ missionary enterprise in Korea and Japan's colonial rule. Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s the growing Sõtõ sect became more and more involved in assisting the cause of Japanese military imperialism in Korea. By the time the Sõtõ sect of³cially withdrew from Korea in September 1945 upon Japan's defeat in the Second World War, there were 103 active Sõtõ temples in Korea (locations and names are given in the Appendix). This was a signi³cant number, especially when one considers that the total number of Korean Buddhist temples was less than 1,000.
No matter what Buddhist polemics one applies to this situation, the heavy presence of Japanese Sõtõ temples in the Korean Peninsula between 1905 and 1945 was basically a political phenomenon: it started with Japan's intrusion into Korea and ended with its withdrawal. In a word, Sõtõ propagation in Korea was viable only within the framework of Japanese colonial imperialism. When Imperial Japan began to expand its political foothold in Korea in the late nineteenth century, Japanese Buddhists were able to launch their enterprises in Korea. When Imperial Japan came crashing to its end in 1945, Japanese Buddhism disappeared from Korea overnight. None of the Buddhist teachings transmitted to the Korean people during this period could be separated from Imperial Japan's political enterprises.
Exactly how was Sõtõ propagation in Korea linked to Japanese imperialism? What roles did the Sõtõ sect play in supporting Japan's political ambitions? In what manner were Buddhist teachings incorporated into the political agenda of Imperial Japan? Of course, these questions can be asked about any of the other Buddhist sects active in colonial Korea as well, since they were also involved in the cause of Japanese imperialism in one way or another. But as far as the Sõtõ sect is concerned, its Buddhist politics in colonial Korea seem to have revolved around three major tasks: Buddhist services for the Japanese military, promotion of the so-called kõminka yW5 (transforming [the colonial peoples] into imperial subjects) policy, and the paci³cation of colonial subjects. Needless to say, all these tasks were closely interrelated.
At the same time, it should be noted that these political roles of Sõtõ Buddhism in colonial Korea were perfectly integrated into a larger context of Zen imperialism in prewar Japan. As Brian VICTORIA most recently documents in detail, Zen Buddhism played a substantial role in nurturing a spirit of fanatic imperial militarism by twisting Buddhist teachings about compassion and non-selfhood (1997). The political expediency of Zen Buddhism was indeed far-reaching and totalitarian. This essay adds the relatively ignored case of Sõtõ Zen in colonial Korea to the larger current debate on Japanese Zen and nationalism (see also HEISIG and MARALDO 1994, and ISHIKAWA 1998) .
Monks and the Military in Imperial Japan
In its initial stage the primary focus of the Sõtõ sect's propagation in Korea was overseas Japanese migrants who were struggling to deal with unfamiliar living conditions. Many Japanese, including merchants, laborers, manufacturers, and farmers, began to migrate to Korea in search of new opportunities and quick money when Korea's treaty ports were opened in 1883. A sizable number of government of³cials and their families, amounting to more than 15,000 by the late 1900s, made a noticeable mark on the Korean landscape. By the time of the 1910 annexation, the population of Japanese migrants in Korea had reached more than 150,000, most of them settled in Ky®ngs®ng, Pusan, Inch'®n, and other major port or railway-station cities.
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As their promotion strategy spelled itself out in the late 1900s, the Sõtõ missionary monks initially concentrated their efforts on the Japanese residents of these major urban settlements. For Buddhist missionaries, Japanese residents having dif³culty coping with isolation and cultural difference must have provided fertile ground for proselytization. Responding to the predicaments of these Japanese residents, Sõtõ monks, ³red with missionary zeal, were from the beginning quite µexible, insisting upon neither Buddhist principles nor sectarian characters. According to the needs of the residents, Sõtõ monks performed funeral ceremonies, memorial services, preaching, and prayer rituals; led gatherings of meditation and recreation; offered public lectures; ran Sunday schools, nursery schools, and other educational programs; and sometimes even offered advice regarding commerce and agriculture. Converting Koreans to Sõtõ Buddhism was a task that would require time and an acquaintance with Korean culture and language.
While hammering out plans and tactics for promoting Sõtõ teachings, Sõtõ missionaries paid special attention to Japanese soldiers stationed in Korea, approaching them by appealing to their absolute loyalty to the emperor. When the wave of nationalism began to surge in the late 1880s, all of the Japanese Buddhist sects, without exception, competed with each other to demonstrate gokoku Bukkyõ D³[î (Buddhism that protects the nation) and so to show that they were authentic instruments for promoting the nationalistic interests of Imperial Japan. In a sense, it is easy to understand why all of the Japanese Buddhist sects eagerly embraced political nationalism at this time. Buddhists, who had endured harsh suppression in the early Meiji years, were, thanks to Shinto ideologues, still subject to hostile public perceptions, and they desperately sought opportunities to escape this position. The tide of nationalism, which focused on efforts to revise unequal treaties with the West, offered them long-awaited momentum. When, in the late 1890s, the Meiji government tried to introduce a religious law that promised equal treatment for all religions, especially Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity, Buddhist leaders initiated a campaign to demand more than just equal treatment: they wanted Buddhism to be designated as a public religion (kõninkyõ NÞî). Japanese Buddhists argued that the proposed religious law, which allowed freedom of residence to foreign Christians, would invite national danger and humiliation. Their arguments for designating Buddhism as a public religion in the name of national defense were timely and compelling: Buddhism was the only religion that could keep Japanese imperial sovereignty from being intruded upon by the West. Christianity, not surprisingly, was accused of being the symbol of a wicked West. In the end, the Buddhist "public religion" movement (kõninkyõ undõ) did not materialize, and the proposal for the controversial religious bill was eventually dumped by the House of Peers in 1900. 4 Nevertheless, it was a major victory for the Buddhists in that they were able to distinguish themselves from Christianity by referring to national security and loyalty to the emperor. In this milieu, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, which occurred a year after the government had of³cially submitted the religious bill to the Diet for approval, proved to be a golden opportunity for the Japanese Buddhist sects. In order to demonstrate their concern for "protecting the nation," each Buddhist sect dispatched chaplains to the war fronts to offer funeral ceremonies and memorial services for fallen soldiers, and to set up programs designed to alleviate the pains of disabled veterans and military families.
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The tone of nationalistic Japanese Buddhism was ³rmly set by the nationwide fever of military imperialism. The Sõtõ sect was, of course, an integral part of nationalistic Buddhism. On the basis of its patriotic experiences in the Sino-Japanese War, the Sõtõ sect ³gured out how it could further bene³t by contributing to the cause of Japan's continental expansion. One 1900 policy statement reads: "To train battlefront chaplains (jðgun fukyõshi Zt+î‚) is an urgent task.... It will not be achieved as quickly as hoped. Now, it is time for our Buddhist order to set up a system for training these personnel on a grand scale" (SJYSH 1993, p. 22) . Two years later, in 1902, the Sõtõ sect of³cially adopted a promulgation guideline designed to more effectively serve the military: "Regulations on the Propagation of [Sõtõ] Teachings to Soldiers" (Gunjin fukyõ kitei t^+îyÝ). According to this guideline, the Sõtõ sect dispatched ³ve battlefront chaplains to Manchuria when war between Japan and Russia broke out in 1904. As the war zone expanded into the Korean Peninsula, so did the number of chaplains deployed.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was a testament to the imperialistic character of Japanese Buddhism-a Buddhism that aroused hostility and inspired belligerence towards neighboring countries. Although there were some Buddhist groups and activists who tried to promote spiritualism and who criticized Buddhism's involvement in the war efforts, the majority of Japanese Buddhists supported the war against Russia.
6 In a collection of his essays entitled Senji Bukkyõ enzetsu ì´[îÜß (Wartime Buddhist lectures), Kawasaki Kenr yõ I2 ßU, a prominent preacher of Higashi Hongan-ji, captures the essence of Japanese Buddhist polemics regarding this imperialistic war.
For us, this war really signi³es the teaching of great religious virtues (zenchishiki 3FAE). We do not have to feel sad. Instead, we should be joyful, for [this war] is a grateful teaching .... No matter what happens, we should defeat the Russian enemy inµicting agony upon us. Under the great authority of the Buddha and the valor of Buddhist repentance, we should achieve the glory of a complete victory.... No matter how many enemies [we] kill, I do not think, even in the slightest degree, that it is a violation against the will of the Buddha. When I contemplate the will of the Buddha as revealed in the entire Buddhist scriptures, I am convinced that my humble opinion is perfectly correct. (KASHIWAHARA 1990, p. 165) Japanese Buddhist support for the war efforts of Imperial Japan included not only the dispatching of chaplains and the offering of death rituals, but also the donation of funds for military use and/or the purchase of military bonds. Right after the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese army established a garrison in Yong'amp'o in northern P'y®ngan Province, at the site where the Russian military had previously run a quartermaster headquarters. Drawn by the presence of the Japanese military, Japanese migrants began to µow into the city. A Sõtõ monk, Hirayama Jinhõ r[_Ð, soon targeted these soldiers and new settlers and launched a mission of "spiritual comfort." He was well received by the Japanese army and migrants. The army headquarters even granted him the free use of an empty building, along with warm words of encouragement: "In celebration of the [Japanese] Apnok (Yalu) garrison's successful landing [here], we extend our support to you to successfully carry out your missionary enterprise for a long time" (SKKDHI 1980, p. 34) . Thus the missionary zeal of Sõtõ chaplains was well nurtured in the barracks of the Japanese military.
In the 1910s Christianity joined Buddhism in promoting the colonial ambition of Imperial Japan. In 1912 the government maneuvered the leaders of Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity into jointly pledging to cooperate among themselves in serving the national interests of Imperial Japan as well as in guiding public opinion. The wave of Taishõ democracy was unable to deter the nationalistic tendencies of sectarian Buddhism (kyõdan Bukkyõ î;[î). Moreover, in an attempt to coordinate sectarian efforts to promote national interests, Buddhist leaders formed a sort of pan-sectarian organization, ³rst called Bukkyõ Rengõkai [î¦ §l (The Federation of Buddhism) and later called Bukkyõ Gokokudan [îD³: (The Buddhist Coalition for Protecting the Nation). They then made a collective effort to further advocate, in the name of protecting the nation, the unity between the Law of the King and the Law of the Buddha. In theory, protecting the Law of the Buddha (gohõ DÀ) now meant protecting the nation (gokoku D³).
7 In this sense, the nationalistic endeavors of Buddhist leaders were in line with the ideals of State Shinto. They even defended the argument that Shinto was not a religion, which made the Christian West very uneasy.
Throughout the Taishõ era (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) , the Sõtõ sect in Korea was a faithful vanguard of nationalistic Buddhism and was particularly concerned with caring for the well-being of the imperial military. When Imperial Japan took control of Manchuria in 1932, the Sõtõ sect set up an ad hoc task force in order to provide the Japanese military, who were deployed along the routes of the Korean Peninsula as far as northern China, with emergency comfort and spiritual guidance. For the military, the presence of Sõtõ monks, well trained in conducting funeral and memorial services was most helpful in regard 7 These pan-sectarian organizations basically sought to integrate all Buddhist sects into the state in the name of returning to the treasured ancient tradition of saisei itchi ø©sO (the unity of administration and rite). In particular, the Bukkyõ Gokokudan declared that it was determined to "sanctify the benevolence of our emperor" by organizing all Buddhist priests and their lay followers (KASHIWAHARA 1990, pp. 199-200). to dealing with war casualties on this remote foreign soil. As war with China broke out in 1937 and battlefronts rapidly spread, the Sõtõ sect, like other Buddhist sects, was, in keeping with the campaign of Konoe's cabinet for general mobilization, dragged further into the war operation. The history of the Sõtõ sect states that ³ve days after the start of the Sino-Japanese War, ³ve chaplains were quickly dispatched to the battlefronts of China; ³ve days later two more chaplains were ordered to follow the advance party, and two more were soon sent to the Manchurian front (SJYSH 1993, pp. 18-20) . The action of the Sõtõ sect was swift and decisive.
In 1939 the Diet ³nally passed the controversial shðkyõ dantaihõ ;î:¿À (Law on Religious Organizations), which the government had been trying to put into effect since 1899. With this legislation, the government was able to ³rmly control all of the religious organizations (including Buddhism) and mobilize them for an all-out continental expansion. Buddhist sects and other religious organizations were all integrated into an ultranationalistic agency that was to be a mere tool of military imperialism. In 1942 all of the Shinto, Buddhist, Christian, and Islamic organizations were absorbed into the Religious Federation for Asian Prosperity (Kõ-A Shðkyõ Dõmei ö!;î|h), and its head was the former four-star general Hayashi Senjðrõ n/YÁ (KASHIWAHARA 1990, pp. 241, 248-50; OKADA 1977) . Under these circumstances, nobody dared to raise a religious argument against or a doctrinal question concerning the solemn duties of imperial Buddhism (kõkoku Bukkyõ y³[î). Until everything came to a crashing halt in August 1945, Japanese Buddhism, including the Sõtõ sect, blindly followed the absolute religion of Japanese military imperialism. And the military chaplains of the Sõtõ sect in Korea served as loyal vanguards of imperial Buddhism.
Sõtõ Missionaries and the Making of Imperial Subjects
From the outset, the propagation of Sõtõ teachings in Korea was more than a religious mission-it was also a political enterprise. According to its of³cial missionary history, the Sõtõ sect claims that the "opening of Sõtõ teachings" in Korea actually occurred with Takeda Hanshi's crossing to the Korean Peninsula in 1890, fourteen years prior to the appointment of the sect's ³rst missionary, Muramatsu Ryõkan, in 1904 (SKKDHI 1980 . Although he had been trained as a Sõtõ priest, when Takeda crossed to Korea in 1890 he was not an active priest, and the purpose of his travel was not religious: he was a drifting right-wing political activist who was interested in promoting Japanese inµuence over Korea. Nevertheless, because of his pioneering contributions to its promulgation, the Sõtõ sect considers him to be the most important of its missionaries in the early stages of its advance into Korea. This perspective reµects the character of Sõtõ propagation, and it is only because of this that Takeda Hanshi deserves our attention.
After crossing to Korea, Takeda Hanshi joined Gen'yõsha éáç, a nationalistic society organized by pan-Asianists, and soon became a key agent of Tenyðkyõdan ú·ð:, a secret suborganization of Gen'yõ-sha. At that time Tenyðkyõdan was expected to instigate war against Ch'ing China, which had already been dragged into the turmoil of the Korean Tonghak X¿ peasants' rebellion. The Sino-Japanese War over control of Korea broke out in 1894 and ended with Japan's victory in 1895. But dissatisfaction provoked by the Tripartite Intervention in the aftermath of the war frustrated Japanese right-wing political activists. Their anger was immediately directed towards Queen Min, who led an anti-Japanese faction in Korea. Takeda Hanshi was among the mob of Japanese right-wing political activists who, in late 1895, assassinated Queen Min. The politically embarrassed Japanese government repatriated the murderers to Japan, and Takeda was imprisoned for some time. Soon after he was freed from jail, Takeda joined Kokuryðkai ¸Ol, a pan-Asianist society under the leadership of Uchida Ryõhei »,dr, and crossed to Korea in 1906, charged with the mission of creating public support for Japan's annexation of Korea (DUUS 1995, pp. 108-12, 235-41; KINOSHITA 1940, pp. 3-11) . This time Takeda approached Yi Yonggu 5 ÙG and Song Py®ngjun [ 3w, two key pro-Japan Korean of³cials in the court who had formed a political society known as Iljinhoe sZl in order to advocate Japan's annexation of Korea. Eventually, Takeda became Iljinhoe's advisor. At the same time, he launched his own project to promote Japanese Buddhism in the hope that this would appease the almost colonized Korean people. His efforts bore fruit in the form of a grand-scale temple, Chogyesa, which was erected in Ky®ngs®ng.
Swayed by Takeda Hanshi's impressive achievements, the Sõtõ sect decided to appoint him director of the newly established Korean propagation bureau in 1908. It was a calculated step for the Sõtõ sect, which wanted to take advantage of Takeda's political connections in order to facilitate the spread of Sõtõ teachings in Korea. This approach, as expected, turned out to be a great success. Helped by Yi Yonggu, chairman of Iljinhoe, Takeda became a special advisor for the newly organized Korean Buddhist order, W®njong é; (the W®n order), a position that enabled him to exert enormous inµuence over Korean Buddhism-inµuence far beyond the scope of a Japanese Buddhist missionary. Ever ambitious, in 1910 Takeda attempted, in collaboration with the Korean monk Yi Hoegwang 5 {M (chairman of W®njong), to absorb the Korean Buddhist order into the Sõtõ sect. In practical terms, the absorption, if realized, would have meant that the Sõtõ sect of Japan would have a vast majority of Korea's powerful temples and priests under its command-a sort of private colonization of Korean Buddhism. Takeda's preposterous endeavor, however, failed as a result of strong opposition by Korean Buddhist leaders, who soon came to understand the implications of his scheme.
8 Nevertheless, the Sõtõ sect made use of Takeda's political skills in Korea until he died in 1911. No doubt, Takeda set the tone of Sõtõ preaching in Korea, and the sect leaders eagerly embraced it.
The Sõtõ sect never diminished its political interests in Korea as long as they were useful, either directly or indirectly, in promoting Japan's colonial rule. This pro-colonial stance was not, of course, restricted to the Sõtõ sect. Other Buddhist sects active in Korea, such as Higashi Hongan-ji, Nishi Hongan-ji, and Nichiren, were all enthusiastic supporters of Japanese colonialism. The Sõtõ sect was not abnormal in engaging in programs that were geared to transforming the Korean people into faithful colonial subjects of Imperial Japan. Sõtõ temples began to run Japanese language schools for Korean followers and taught them what Imperial Japan considered desirable with regard to morality, attitude, behavior, and practical skills. For example, in the early 1920s a missionary monk named Mitsuhisa Hiroaki MÄNg (at Poksusa in Masan) incorporated a wide range of educational programs into his mission and made an effort to mold lay Korean followers into loyal imperial subjects. To that end, he organized the laypeople into three subgroups and, in the name of social enlightenment, set up various programs pertinent to each group (SKKDHI 1980, p. 39) . Educational programs, not Buddhist preaching, were, indeed, the primary concern of many Sõtõ missionaries working in 8 In 1908 ³fty-two representatives of Korean temples, who were worried about the deteriorating political situation in Korea, convened at W®nhu ›ng Temple in Ky®ngs®ng and formed an organization called the W®njong order in order to protect their collective interests. The monk Yi Hoegwang, who maintained political connections with pro-Japanese collaborators such as Yi Yonggu, managed to get elected as leader of this organization. Soon after Korea had been colonized, Yi Hoegwang and Takeda Hanshi conspired to take over the W®njong order and to expand their own power base within Korean Buddhism. When the subversive terms that they hammered out with the Sõtõ sect for the merger were revealed to the Korean press, Korean Buddhist leaders were shocked at the "selling off" of Korean Buddhism to a Japanese sect. Anti-Japanese monks such as Pak Hany®ng and Han Yongun immediately countered the merger attempt with a nationwide campaign to restore a spirit of independence to Korean Buddhism. Amid this ongoing scufµing, in 1911 the GovernmentGeneral issued Sach'ally®ng (Laws for Temples) and brought Korean as well as Japanese Buddhist temples in Korea under its control. For more detailed discussions of Takeda Hanshi and the merger episode, see TAKAHASHI 1929, pp. 918-40; and CH®NG 1994, pp. 65-69. colonial Korea. What was really at stake was not the spread of Buddhist teachings but the thought and behavior of the Korean people, which were to be compatible with the cause of Japanese colonialism.
Beginning in the late 1930s, the ultimate goal of the Sõtõ sect in Korea was to make Koreans loyal subjects of Imperial Japan. Once Imperial Japan began to expand into China in the 1930s, anything that might work against that objective could not be tolerated. With regard to colonial Korea, the mandate of Japanese military imperialism was, quite simply, to fully mobilize Korea's available resources, spiritual or material, for the purpose of carrying out Japan's continental ambition. The Japanese colonial government was now determined to suppress and deny the Korean people's ethnic identity on the one hand and to incorporate them into what it euphemistically glori³ed as a "one-family nation" (kazoku kokka BŸ³B) on the other. These policies culminated with the kõminka movement that came into full swing in 1937 when the colonial government imposed the "Oath as Subjects of the Imperial Nation" (kõkoku shinmin no seishi y³SWu½Ÿ) upon the Korean people. Colonial leaders at the Government-General of Korea vowed to transform the Korean people into true loyal subjects of Imperial Japan. In other words, the kõminka movement aimed to eradicate the Koreanness of the Korean people and to convert them into colonial subjects who would eagerly "repay His Majesty [the Japanese emperor] as well as the country [Imperial Japan] with loyalty and sincerity."
9 It was, in a word, a brainwashing campaign. The colonial government targeted language and religion. Needless to say, these targets were precisely the things that, for a long time, Japanese Buddhist missionaries in Korea had been concentrating on. Japan's attitude towards language and religion provides a historical context for seeing how the propagation of Sõtõ Buddhism became part of the politics of colonial rule in Korea between the late 1930s and 1945.
The acceptance of Japanese as the national language was considered to be a prerequisite for being a loyal subject of Imperial Japan. As a way to boost the national language, the Government-General of Korea not only enforced Japanese upon all Korean students but also, beginning in 1938, launched language outreach programs for the general public. Furthermore, the colonial government removed the Korean language (which was thought to nurture Korean nationalism) from the school curriculum in 1941.
10 Not surprisingly, the Sõtõ sect, which had been steadily promoting the Japanese language to Koreans, fully cooperated with the national language campaign by further expanding its role in language education. More Japanese language programs were set up at Sõtõ temples and other propagation centers in order to reach a wider audience of lay followers, and Korean was abandoned as a medium of proselytization. The kõminka movement also promoted State Shinto and suppressed those religions that resisted it-most conspicuously, Christianity. After the establishment of Grand Chõsen Shrine (Chos®n Shingung †1 P·) in Ky®ngs®ng in 1925, Shinto shrines in Korea rapidly increased. By 1937 there were 368 Shinto shrines in Korea. Con³dent of Koreans' acceptance of Shinto, in 1937 the colonial government ³nally decided to establish at least one shrine in each local district (or my®n s unit) in order to force all Koreans to conduct a daily ceremony of allegiance. This ceremony, which was conducted every morning facing the east (where the emperor presided over the one-family nation), was known as tongbang yobae (tõhõ yõhai X¾í0). Shinto shrines in Korea, both large and small, numbered more than 900 by 1945 (HARDACRE 1989, pp. 95-96) . From this time on, Japanese Buddhist sects, which had always been supportive of State Shinto, were more preoccupied with the task of creating loyal Korean subjects than with spreading Buddhist teachings.
The Sõtõ sect was no exception. When the kõminka movement was initiated, the Sõtõ missionary Kawamura Dõki IªŠ^assumed the headship of the Pusanjin temple. He soon approached the principal of Pusan Second Commerce School and persuaded him that Sõtõ-style sitting meditation would be the best form of meditation to use to train Korean students as loyal imperial subjects. Half a year later, the Sõtõ sect's missionary history claims that people were "really surprised at the changed atmosphere of Pusan Commerce School" (SKKDHI 1980, p. 43) . The Pusan Second Commerce school thereafter served as a role model for how best to raise imperial students in Korea. The practice of Sõtõ-style sitting meditation was widely mobilized as a means of promoting the spirit of Japanese military imperialism.
It is, therefore, not surprising that, in the late 1930s, some Sõtõ priests began to propose a thesis concerning the unity of Zen and the spirit of Japan's imperial state. For example, in 1939 the eminent Sõtõ given name). It was enforced in February 1940 as a last-ditch attempt to convert Koreans into loyal Japanese subjects. By August 1940 more than three million households, approximately three-quarters of all households, adopted new family names. Those Koreans who refused to change their names were deprived of job opportunities or ousted from their positions, and their children were denied entrance to school. See CHOU 1996, pp. 58-61. scholar Nakane Kandõ _Í0} (1876-1959), a future president of Komazawa University, argued in "Totalitarianism and Zen" (Zentaishugi to Zen 6¿ü-o7) that the quintessence of Japanese cultural tradition was to be found in the unity between the emperor and the people. Such unity, he continued, could be furthered when one realized the non-selfness of Buddhist spirit, a Buddhist truth that was attainable through the practice of Sõtõ-style sitting meditation (SJYSH 1993, p. 29) .
11 Nakane's Sõtõ Zen polemics were, in a word, meant to sanctify the Buddhist tenet of non-selfness in order to aid the political ideology of Japanese military imperialism, according to which people (as loyal subjects of the emperor) were urged to discard their small selfness for the larger glory of the imperial state. The Sõtõ sect tried to present Buddhist ideas and practices as authentic and privileged instruments for the glori³cation of Imperial Japan. In 1941 the Sõtõ sect subjected the rationale of its Buddhist teachings and practices to the political ambition of Imperial Japan by voluntarily revising its charter in accordance with the Law on Religious Organizations. In this charter Sõtõ meditation was clearly de³ned as a form of disciplinary training whose purpose was to encourage Buddhist followers to sacri³ce their individual selves for the larger collective self of Imperial Japan (SJYSH 1993, p. 30; HIRAYAMA 1992, pp. 503-7) .
Ironically, however, the Buddhist appeal to Koreans for non-selfness could not be promoted without force, even within the context of war. Sõtõ monks themselves doubted Korean compliance with the call for total sacri³ce. And yet the Sõtõ-style kõminka movement continued its experimentations until its withdrawal from Korea in 1945.
Sõtõ Monks and the Paci³cation of Colonial Subjects
Throughout the colonial years aggressive efforts to transform the Korean people into subservient subjects of Imperial Japan were supplemented by less forceful efforts. Whereas the former featured the enforcement of brainwashing measures and the outright suppression of anti-Japanese elements in Korean society, the latter featured the attempt to placate the anger, frustration, and psychological resistance of Koreans through persuasion. This dual approach to paci³cation was a lesson that Meiji political leaders had learned through trial and 11 At that time Nakane was one of the key speakers mobilized in support of the Sõtõ sect's public campaign, known as Seishin hõkoku kõenkai ·P³³"Ül (Lecture series for spiritual patriotism), which advocated Imperial Japan's continental expansion. His other works included Katei to Zen BÒo7 (Zen in family life), Kyõiku to Zen îpo7 (Education and Zen), and Katei to shðkyõ BÒo;î (Family and religion). error before they attempted to extend colonial rule over Korea. In order to subjugate Korea in the late 1900s they had to quash antiJapanese struggles led by Confucian literati and local activists. In their attempts to eliminate such opposition, what the Japanese imperialists found most troublesome was not so much the military strength of Korean "righteous armies" but the burning hatred towards Japan. The psychological resistance put up by the Koreans was not easily overcome by guns and swords, and it persisted even after the subjugation of most of the independent activists. This was what the colonial government referred to as the "problem of public thought." On the surface, in the 1910s rule by bayonet seemed to work, but colonial government of³cials were worried that Koreans were far from being fully reconciled to Japanese rule. Korean anti-Japanese sentiments seemed unpredictable and potentially dangerous enough to interrupt the smooth passage of Japanese imperialism. With the March First Movement of 1919, this anxiety proved to be a dismaying reality. This nationwide disturbance, the colonial leaders ³gured, stemmed in large part from the problem of public thought. The so-called "paci³cation" (senbu èC) policy, which the colonial government promoted right after the annexation and pursued far more vigorously after the March First Movement, was born out of concern with this "thought" (shisõ "`) problem.
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The colonial government found that Buddhism could be mobilized as a vehicle to carry out the campaign to pacify the anti-Japanese sentiments of Koreans. And besides, Buddhism was the only option available in Korea. Other organized religions, particularly Christianity, remained staunchly anti-Japanese and were precisely what the colonial government wanted to dismantle and replace with State Shinto. In contrast, Buddhism, which had previously been a sort of social outcast in Korea, was stimulated by Japanese Buddhism. After the prolonged period of ridicule and abuse that Chos®n Buddhism had endured, it suddenly seemed full of political possibilities. Furthermore, Buddhist monks, subjected to unbearable suppression and humiliation in Chos®n society, were eager to take advantage of opportunities to enhance their social status (CH®NG 1994, pp. 9-25) . At this juncture of religious transition the colonial government realized that Japanese Buddhists had the potential to play a leading role in the paci³cation of Korea. For Japanese Buddhists in Korea, this expectation was a blessing that would aid in their expansion. Clearly, Japanese Buddhism in colonial Korea owed its prosperity to being a political agent serving the cause of Imperial Japan rather than to being a religious organization dedicated to Buddhist teaching.
In 1912 the Governor-General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake ±» ±p, stated in his New Year message addressed to the head monks of the nation's thirty main temples that Buddhists were expected to play a leading role in placating the minds of the Korean people. His statement clearly showed why his colonial government enforced the Law for Temples (sach'ally®ng ±Þ|), which controlled the administration of Korean Buddhism until 1945. According to this law, which came into effect in 1911, all of the Korean temples were organized into a sort of parish system that was divided into the territorial units of thirty main temples. The colonial government held supreme executive rights concerning the appointment of head monks and the control of temple properties. After Korean Buddhism was firmly under control, the colonial government began to mobilize it for the paci³cation of public thought. As all of the successive Governors-General and high of³cials repeatedly emphasized, Buddhist priests were expected to mollify Korean antagonism towards Imperial Japan's colonial rule (CH®NG 1994, pp. 79-90) .
In fact, Japanese Buddhist missionaries, with the support of the colonial government, were enthusiastic agents of the paci³cation campaign. They were not only directly involved in propagating the ever rising glory of Imperial Japan, they were also engaged in channeling their ideology into Korean Buddhism. In this endeavor there were no particular sectarian distinctions between Japanese missionaries in Korea. Obviously, the Sõtõ sect was an integral part of this indoctrination campaign. Sõtõ missionary history describes, for example, how it was able to secure its foothold in Korean soil in the Taishõ era.
Although it had met various dif³culties, the opening of teachings in Korea became suddenly energized in the Taishõ era. Temples and propagational centers were erected one after another. The propagation was on the track of tremendous success, enabling the Sõtõ sect in Korea to see its missionary enterprises steadily expanding. One of the factors that made this possible was the doing of the Governor-General, who tried to dissolve the political dissatisfaction of the Korean people through religious education, in particular through Buddhist education. For that end, the Governor-General showed, directly and indirectly, a favorable attitude toward Buddhist temples. After the problem between Japan and Korea [a reference to the March First Movement] had surfaced, uprisings frequently broke out here and there. The primary reason [for the revolts], as the Governor-General understood, stemmed from the prob-lem of public thought. For the guidance and edi³cation of public thought, some government of³cials thought that it would be best to rely upon Buddhist missionaries. For that reason, it can be said that Buddhists came to receive special protection [from the government]. Thanks to the favor of the Governor-General, the propagation enjoyed considerable freedom.
( SKKDHI 1980, pp. 37-38) In dealing with Korean antagonism towards Japan's colonial rule, the Sõtõ sect delivered the message of non-self resignation, urged compliance to and acceptance of the changed world, and provided a wide range of communal services to make Koreans feel good (e.g., education, religious rituals, social work, and charitable activities).
In 1925 the Sõtõ sect became a founding member of Chos®n Pulgyodan †1[î: (Association of Korean Buddhism)-a nationwide Buddhist organization that Kobayashi Genroku, Yi Yunyong, and other pro-Japanese sympathizers had organized to promote harmony between Korea and Japan in the name of the universal compassion of Buddhism. Chos®n Pulgyodan soon launched all kinds of projects that Governor-General Saitõ Makoto tersely de³ned as "being necessary and helpful in realizing our hope" (CH®NG 1994, p. 181) . The Sõtõ sect, other Japanese sects, and Korean member temples were all involved in carrying out pan-sectarian projects designed to reconcile the colonizers and the colonized. These projects included: public lectures; the showing of enlightenment movies; the training of Korean Buddhist missionaries; the publication of journals, books, and posters; research on Korean Buddhism; language education; social programs; and the sending of young Korean Buddhists to study in Japan. Among these, it was the publication projects that the Chos®n Pulgyodan promoted most aggressively, for it was believed that they exerted the largest impact upon Koreans. The association's of³cial journal, Chos®n Pulgyo [Korean Buddhism], played a leading role in bringing Koreans into the political mold of Imperial Japan (CH®NG 1994, pp. 179-80) . In the name of Buddhist friendship and spirituality, Japanese Buddhists in Korea, including Sõtõ monks, helped to mollify the anti-Japanese sentiments of Koreans-sentiments that the colonial government had found it too dif³cult to deal with through physical violence alone.
The Buddhist campaign of paci³cation intensi³ed as Imperial Japan's unending continental expansion continued to incite anti-Japanese sentiments and local protests in northeastern Asia. In this situation Japanese Buddhists were naturally dragged into the battle³elds. Throughout the late 1930s to 1945 the Japanese military continued to use Buddhist missionaries for its propaganda efforts (senbu kõsaku èC^6) at the war fronts, where the most effective propagandistic activities were conducted by Sõtõ missionaries. The Sõtõ sect praised the patriotic operation:
In various parts [of Asia], [they] are wholeheartedly engaged in religious cultural operations such as serving the spirits of departed war heroes, providing war refugees with medicine and medical treatment, Japanese language education, and so on. Our religious warriors (shðkyõ senshi ;îìw), who have vowed to assist the cause of the Prosperity of Asia (kõ-A yokusan ö!öh), are steadfastly devoted to enhancing the spirit of our organization at the forefronts of the continent.
( SKKDHI 1980, p. 96) Religious teaching was now referred to as a "religious cultural operation" (shðkyõ bunka kõsaku ;îk5^6)-a de³nition that gained its full meaning in the context of the colonial paci³cation campaign. Buddhist missionary warriors turned out to be loyal vanguard-agents of Japanese military imperialism. In 1938 Sõtõ headquarters in Japan dispatched chief emissary Yamada Ekihõ [,dÐ to comfort Japanese troops stationed in Korea and began to assign more missionaries to Korea as the Sino-Japanese War intensi³ed. Even though battles did not actually take place on Korean soil, the Korean Peninsula was strategically crucial, as it was the channel through which troops and logistic materials were supplied to northern China. As war fronts expanded in China, the Japanese government built more and more barracks to house reser ve armies in the Korean Peninsula and stored more and more war supplies at various strategic points, thus creating a general atmosphere of crisis. Any anti-Japanese agitation in such a strategic supply base could not be tolerated. The colonial government made every effort to boost the spirit of nai-Sen itchi »1sO (the unity between inside [Japan] and Chõsen) through paci³cation operations (NAKANÕ 1976, pp. 205-8) . Following the lead of the colonial government, in 1939 the Sõtõ sect established an education camp for training missionary warriors at Komazawa University and began to take part in the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.
Conclusion: The Buddhist Mission and the Politics of Cultural Hierarchy
The missionary enterprises of Japanese Buddhists in Korea came to an abrupt end with the defeat of Japan in 1945. All Japanese monks and missionaries withdrew to Japan at the moment of surrender, as if resolutely renouncing all of what they had achieved in colonial Korea.
On 1 September 1945, the Ky®ngs®ng headquarters of the Sõtõ sect ordered all Sõtõ personnel to immediately evacuate Korea. With this order, the Sõtõ sect permanently ceased its assiduous efforts to promote Buddhist teachings to Koreans-efforts that began in the late Meiji period. Thirty-³ve years later, in 1980, the Sõtõ sect looked back at its past missions in the Asian continent.
Including devotion to the paci³cation operations that were directed toward the local residents of conquered territories, the solemn enterprises of [our] Buddhist teachers, who had wholeheartedly promoted the sincerity of universal benevolence (ittshi dõjin soe|_) [under the emperor], completely vanished with the defeat. We should, however, remember the heroic traces of these virtuous pioneers forever. (SKKDHI 1980, p. 8) Nostalgic praise lingered long. The sect considered Sõtõ propagation in colonial Asia to have been a solemn enterprise (jõgyõ þ%, literally, a "pure business") deserving perpetual honor and respect.
It is true that this exaltation was later openly criticized from within and was of³cially negated. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Sõtõ propaganda in colonial Korea was closely intertwined with the political agenda of Japan's military imperialism. In fact, the political instrumentality of the Sõtõ mission in colonial Korea was clearly illustrated in a series of resolutions that the Sõtõ missionary headquarters voluntarily imposed upon its members once Japan entered full-blown war status in the late 1930s. One of these resolutions, adopted in 1940, included two politically oriented recommendations (in addition to half a dozen admonitions regarding temperate lifestyles) that pointedly directed the Sõtõ missionaries to work for the good of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. One recommendation was to organize unemployed lay housewives and to teach them specially designed courses dealing with such subjects as manufacturing skills, hygiene, nursing, and so on-all of which were useful for the war effort. The other was to establish organizations that would help to realize the prosperity of Asia (kõ-A hõkõkai ö!´Nl) (SKKDHI 1980, pp. 43-44) . The Sõtõ sect found that its Buddhist mission of universal salvation was closely tied to the cause of "the coprosperity of Asia" in Korea. The ³nal destination of this missionary zeal was a political one. Koreans had little defense against the penetration of colonial Buddhism.
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In retrospect, the slogan the Japanese Buddhists voiced when they HUR: Sõtõ Sect and Japanese Imperialism in Korea 127 ³rst advanced on Korea at the turn of the nineteenth century was, in fact, concerned with the spiritual enlightenment and universal salvation of Buddhism. From the outset, however, their Buddhist teachings were destined to be both imperialist and racist: imperialist in that they served the political interest of Japan, and racist in that they targeted particular racial groups for "enlightenment." When we compare Japanese Buddhism's imperialism with its racism, it must be said that its mission in colonial Korea seems to have been dominated by the former. Obviously, the political mission of Japanese Buddhism in Korea ended in 1945, but what lingered long after was the legacy of its racism-a racism that had been deeply embedded in it during Korea's colonial years. Japanese Buddhist missionaries, who perceived themselves as being ethnically superior, incorporated race into their preaching on Buddhist compassion and enlightenment. This exerted a grave impact upon Korean Buddhist culture. For example, language was a cultural pawn that served as a yardstick of racial superiority.
14 Why were Japanese Buddhist missionaries so eager to open Japanese language schools in colonial Korea? Their intention was obviously to lure more Korean followers, relying upon the hidden political expediency of the Japanese language. At the same time they were serious in contending that Buddhist truths could be better transmitted through the Japanese language. This attitude belittled Koreans and, by extension, Korean Buddhist culture and tradition. Korea's traditional Buddhist ideas and customs were devalued and readjusted during the colonial years as a result of the presence of a "more modernized and better transmitted" Japanese Buddhism. Two particularly revolutionary changes were applied to Buddhist priests in the early 1910s: the freedom to eat meat and the freedom to marry. Despite ³erce opposition to the attempt to abandon these two cardinal precepts, many Korean monks were persuaded to embrace the "enlightened practices" of Japanese Buddhism. 15 14 In addition to the language matter, there were more direct indications that the Japanese thought of the Korean people as an inferior race. As the Sõtõ sect acknowledges, its missionary monks in Korea usually called Koreans Senjin 1^, a derogatory ethnic appellation. At the time of annexation, the Japanese used to refer to Koreans as Kankokujin H³^, Kanjin H^, or, rarely, Chõsenjin †1^. Kan H was a character indicating the ethnic identity of Koreans, but it was gradually replaced with the second character sen 1 of the lost dynasty Chõsen †1. This aroused strong resentment among Koreans, who regarded it as a form of ethnic humiliation. 15 It is true that some Korean monks strongly supported these changes under the pretext of reforming Korean Buddhism. In particular, in 1913 a Buddhist reformist, Han Yongun, asserted in his Chos®n Pulgyo yushin ron †1[îdGÇ (A thesis on reforming Korean Buddhism) that in order to revitalize Korean Buddhism monks should be allowed to marry. The
In the long run, these changes, claimed as a benchmark of modern Korean Buddhism on the one hand and disclaimed as a symbol of Japanized Korean Buddhism on the other, seriously disrupted the world of Korean Buddhism long after Korea's liberation in 1945. The issues of meat-eating and marriage, which had been triggered by a politics of race, caused sectarian disputes and in³ghting within Korean Buddhism for decades.
The "Imperial Way Buddhists" of Sõtõ Zen have left an indelible mark on Korean Buddhism. In particular, given that Korean Buddhism has been dominated by the S®n (Zen) tradition, the impact of Sõtõ imperialism was especially deep and far-reaching. In this sense, the task of understanding the multifarious dimensions of Zen nationalism requires multifarious approaches not only beyond the geographical boundary of Imperial Japan and its people but also beyond the scope of political instrumentality.
APPENDIX: SÕTÕ TEMPLES IN COLONIAL KOREA (SKKDHI 1980, p. 30) stubborn refusal to allow Buddhist monks to marry, he argued, had done serious harm to the development of Korean Buddhism in four respects: (1) it was ethically wrong because celibate monks disrupted the natural µow of generational reproduction; (2) it had a negative impact upon national strength because it decreased the population; (3) it inhibited the propagation of Buddhism because many monks gave up celibacy in favor of "normal" life and so withdrew from their Buddhist careers; and (4) the blind suppression of one of the most basic human instincts could lead to scandals and crimes. But most Korean monks had two arguments against these sudden changes. One was that meat-eating and marriage were outright violations of the two most important Buddhist commandments: the prohibition on killing any sentient beings and the strict ban on lewd and unchaste conduct. The other was that these changes were a product of degenerate Japanese Buddhist practices and would destroy Korean Buddhism.
